India and It’s Neighbours Online Test 12th Political Science Lesson 10 Questions in English

India has a long land frontier and coastline. It shares boundaries with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Bhutan, China, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, and Sri Lanka. India has adopted a foreign policy of neutrality and non-involvement.

With India being situated in a politically sensitive geography, her relations with the neighbours are always characterized by ups and downs.The foreign policy orientations and attitudes of all these countries towards India exercised profound influence on the framers of the India’s foreign policy. On its part India tried to maintain cordial and friendly relations with these countries but has faced considerable difficulties in dealing with some of the neighbouring countries and often they have adopted hostile postures towards India. In her relations with the neighbours, India has been following the five principles of the famous Panchsheel.

India has sought to establish its presence in Afghanistan from the early days of its independence in 1947.In 1950, Afghanistan and India signed a “Friendship Treaty.”

India had robust ties with Afghanistan during King Zahir Shah’s regime. Prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979, India had formalized agreements and protocols with various Pro-Soviet regimes in Kabul. While India’s role in Afghanistan was constrained during the Anti-Soviet jihad, between 1979 and 1989, India expanded its development activities in Afghanistan, focusing upon industrial, irrigation, and hydroelectric projects.

After the Taliban consolidated their hold on Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, India struggled to maintain its presence and to support anti-Taliban forces. However, Indian objectives in Afghanistan remained modest given the constrained environment. India aimed to undermine the ability of the Taliban to consolidate its power in Afghanistan, principally by supporting the Northern Alliance in tandem with other regional actors. Working with Iran, Russia, and Tajikistan, India provided important resources to the Northern Alliance, the only meaningful challenge to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Since 2001, India has relied upon development projects and other forms of humanitarian assistance.

In 2005, India proposed Afghanistan’s membership in SAARC and in April 3, 2007 it joined. Expanding India’s presence in Afghanistan through increased Indian training of Afghan civilian and military personnel, development projects, and expanded economic ties. India and Pakistan competition in Afghanistan is seen as a new “Great Game”.

Afghan is India’s natural ally. India is interested in retaining Afghanistan as a friendly state from which it has the capacity to monitor Pakistan and cultivate assets to influence activities in Pakistan. While India is keenly interested in cultivating a significant partnership with Afghanistan, Pakistan is trying to deny India such opportunities. India’s interest in Afghan is more than just Pakistan-centric and reflects its aspiration to be seen as a regional power. Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan and Afghanistan has dangerous effects in the domestic social fabric of India.

Afghanistan has a mineral wealth of about US $1-3 trillion which includes Iron ore, Lithium, Chromium, Natural Gas, Petroleum etc. Safeguarding Indian investments and personnel in Afghanistan is of utmost importance to India as Indian investment in Afghan amounts to about US $3bn.

The top commodities exported by India were man-made staple fibres, cereals, tobacco, electrical machinery, dairy product, eggs, honey, rubber products, pharmaceuticals, clothing accessories, boilers and machineries whereas the imports mainly comprised of fresh fruits, dried fruits/nuts, raisins, vegetables, oil seeds, precious/semi-precious stones etc. To achieve the possibilities of trade, India and Afghanistan signed a Preferential Trade Agreement in March 2003 under which India allowed substantial duty concessions ranging from 50% to 100% to certain category (38 items) of Afghan dry fruits.

In November 2011, India removed basic customs duties for all products of Afghanistan (except alcohol and tobacco) giving them duty free access to the Indian market. India is one of the major export destinations of Afghanistan’s goods.

Recently the Indian government has approved USD 85 Million for upgrading the capacity of Chabahar Port in Iran for an alternate trade transit route for Afghanistan.

Recently the Indian government has approved USD 85 Million for upgrading the capacity of Chabahar Port in Iran for an alternate trade transit route for Afghanistan.//

India faced many security challenges from the Taliban in Afghan during the 1990s.Pakistan has raised and supported several militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen/Harkatul-Ansar, and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami among others, which operate in India. All of these groups have trained in Afghanistan, with varying proximity to the Taliban and by extension Al-Qaeda. Thus, India is absolutely clear that Afghanistan should not again become a terrorist safe haven. Radical ideologies and terrorism spreading in this region are a security threat for India.

With Pakistan increasing its strategic depth in Afghanistan, it can reverse the gain of India. Pakistan can incubate and move around various anti-India groups in Afghan especially in Loya Paktia. The golden crescent comprising of Iran, Afghan, and Pakistan is a worry for India, especially with respect to the issue of drug abuse in Punjab. Islamic State is using Afghan as an outpost in Asia as it has come under stress in Iraq and Syria.

In 2011, India became the first country that Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement. Until then, India was following the US demand of India’s limited cooperation with Afghanistan. India has repeatedly stressed that its relationship with Afghanistan is independent of Pakistan.

India argues that the tripartite relationship between India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan is mutually independent. In both the 1965 and 1971 wars, Afghanistan was non-committal and did not support India. On the Kashmir issue, Afghanistan has not publicly supported India. India has not entered the debate on the Durand Line.

India also realises that stability can result in Afghanistan only if all the major actors and countries have a stake in its stability, growth and prosperity. India has been championing efforts to attract regional and trans-regional investment into Afghanistan that provides a viable alternative to the dominant narrative of extremism and offers job opportunities to its population by pioneering events like the Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan in June 2012. Recognising that the region holds the key to peace in Afghanistan, India is spearheading commercial confidence building measures in the region within the purview of the Heart of Asia Process.

Multilaterally, it helped initiate a dialogue on Afghanistan through various platforms like the Afghanistan-India-US trilateral and the Afghanistan-India-Iran trilateral that seek to bring together international partners with disparate worldviews in pursuit of the common goal of securing peace and prosperity in Afghanistan.

India also expressed its support to international cooperation on Afghanistan at the UN and at various international conferences focused on the future of Afghanistan, including the seminal Tokyo Developmental Conference in July 2012 and London Conference in December 2014.

In 2015, in a first major offensive military platform to Kabul, India gifted three Mi 25 attack helicopters. The delivery marks the first time India has gifted offensive combat capability to Afghanistan, a sensitive topic in the past due to strong objections by Pakistan. Under the agreement, India will also train Afghan defence personnel in operations.

In1999, Pakistan terrorists hijacked Indian Airlines flight IC:814 and landed it in Kandahar, Afghanistan during Taliban rule.

India’s developmental approach has earned it immense goodwill among the Afghan people. However, the “soft power” strategy has limitations. Thus, India is in the dilemma between continued soft-power or to aggressively push its hard power. While India’s principled position that it will not directly or publicly talk to the Taliban until it engages the Afghan government, it is necessary that India stays abreast of all negotiations and isn’t cut out of the resolution process.

History has been uncharitable to India and Pakistan, two close neighbours who, just a little over seven decades, shared geography, culture, religion, language, and the very ethos and philosophy of life that sustained an ancient civilization. The bitter partition of India and Pakistan, led mass migration amidst horrendous violence as Muslims fled to Pakistan and Hindus and Sikhs to India in millions. The tragedy that began at the time of partition continues to have effect until this day in forms of wars that both countries fought and the menace of terrorism for which both countries are victims.

The region of Kashmir is at the heart of hostility between the neighbours and was the cause of two of their three wars since independence from Britain in 1947.

Under the partition plan provided by the Indian Independence Act, Kashmir was free to accede to either India or Pakistan. The Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, initially wanted Kashmir to become an independent nation – but in October 1947 chose to join India, in return for its help against an invasion of tribesmen from Pakistan. A war erupted and India approached the United Nations asking it to intervene.

The war came to an end on January 1, 1949, by a UN-mandated ceasefire line, along with the deployment of a UN peace-keeping group at the ceasefire line. This was the first Indo-Pakistani war. This proved to be the longest-running war over Kashmir, but was also the least costly as a result of the limited nature of the firepower employed by both sides. As a fallout of end of war in Kashmir a result of the ceasefire agreement, a Line Of Control (LOC) was established between the opposing armies, which left Pakistan occupying about a third of the State.

The United Nations recommended holding a plebiscite to settle the question of whether the state would join India or Pakistan. However, the two countries could not agree to a deal to demilitarise the region before the referendum could be held. In July 1949, India and Pakistan signed an agreement to establish a ceasefire line as recommended by the UN and the region became divided.

A second war followed in 1965. The only declared war between Pakistan and India was in 1971, rest of the wars were more related to the border skirmish and not a declared battle. What is more, since the time both nations got their freedom, they have always been assuring each other that both stood for peace and not for war.

In 1999, India fought a brief but bitter conflict with Pakistani-backed forces known as the Kargil War. By that time, India and Pakistan had both declared themselves to be nuclear powers. Separatists began an insurgency against Indian rule in 1989 backed by Pakistan and since then tens of thousands of people have been killed there due to terrorism.

The Shimla Agreement was signed between India and Pakistan on 2 July 1972 in Shimla, the capital city of the Indian state Himachal Pradesh. It followed the Bangladesh Liberation war in 1971 that led to the independence of Bangladesh, which was earlier known as East Pakistan and was part of the territory of Pakistan. India entered the war as an ally of Bangladesh which transformed the war into an Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. The agreement was ratified by the Parliaments of both the nations in same year. The treaty was signed in Shimla by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the President of Pakistan, and Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India. The agreement also paved the way for diplomatic recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan.

Today the question of India – Pakistan relations revolves around three major issues; Kashmir, Terrorism and Economic relations. While, each of these aspects are interlinked, it is important to understand by itself these issues are a major concern for the peace of South Asia. Having not been able to take over Kashmir, and also having lost East Pakistan (now called Bangladesh) due to India’s intervention in 1971, Pakistan is keen in destabilising India by supporting terrorism.

On August 5, 2019, the President of India gave assent to the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 2019, issued under Article 370(1) of the Constitution of India. While exercising power under Article 370 (1), the President has repealed all the clauses of Article 370.However, Article 370(1) has been extended with certain modifications. By virtue of those modifications, all the provisions of the Constitution of India shall be applicable to Jammu and Kashmir.

Indian and Pakistani forces have faced off against each other in mountains above the Siachen glacier in the Karakoram range, the world’s highest battlefield, since 1984.The two sides have been trying to find a solution that would allow them to withdraw troops, but no solution has been arrived at so far.

Surgical Strikes was launched as a response to Pakistan’s frequent provocations along the border and Line of Control.

™ Surgical strikes are attacks on particular opponent targets.

™ They aim at having a minimum damage to the surrounding structures including civilian buildings.

™ They aim at having a zero or minimum deaths of civilians

The two countries disagree over use of the water flowing down rivers that rise in Kashmir and run into the Indus river basin which goes to Pakistan. The use of the water is governed by the 1960 Indus Water Treaty under which India was granted the use of water from three eastern rivers, and Pakistan the use of three western rivers. Pakistan says India is unfairly diverting water with the upstream construction of barrages and dams. India denies the charge.

Kashmir and Siachen aren’t the only issues the two nuclear powers of South Asia lock horns. Sir Creek is another major issue that’s been waiting for a resolution for over 70 years. Sir Creek is a 96-km strip of water disputed between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch marshlands.

A car bomb exploded near the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly on 1 October 2001, killing 27 people. It was an attack that was blamed on Kashmiri separatists. It was one of the most prominent attacks against India apart from the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001.

Abdul Ghani Lone, a prominent All Party Hurriyat Conference leader, was assassinated by an un-identified gun-men during a memorial rally in Srinagar. The assassination resulted in wide-scale demonstrations against the Indian forces for failing to provide enough security cover for Mr. Lone.

The 2008 Mumbai attacks (Also referred to as 26/11) were a series of terrorist attacks that took place in November 2008: 10 members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, an Islamic terrorist organisation based in Pakistan, carried out 12 coordinated shooting and bombing attacks lasting four days across Mumbai. The attacks, which drew widespread global condemnation, began on Wednesday 26 November and lasted until Saturday 29 November 2008. At least 174 people died, including 9 attackers, and more than 300 were wounded.

2016 Uri attack: A terrorist attack by four heavily armed terrorists on 18 September 2016 near the town of Uri in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir killed 18 and left more than 20 people injured. It was reported as “the deadliest attack on security forces in Kashmir in two decades”.

2019 Pulwama attack: On 14 February 2019, a convoy of vehicles carrying security personnel on the Jammu Srinagar national highway was attacked by a vehicle-bound suicide bomber in Lethpora near Awantipora, Pulwama district, Jammu and Kashmir. The responsibility of the attack was claimed by the Pakistanbased Islamist militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed.

2019 Pulwama attack: The attack resulted in the death of 38 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel. This took place in Pulwama district of Jammu and Kashmir.

Bangladesh is one of the most important neighbours of India. Bangladesh is also a key partner to India in the South Asian region, and is crucial both for stability in the north-eastern region and as a bridge to South-East Asia. It is an important lynchpin to India’s ‘Look East’ policy. In 1970, the Bengali Awami League Party won the Pakistani National Elections. But West Pakistan refused to recognize the election results and used brutal force to suppress the agitation by the Awami League Party. This situation led to near war scenario, with armed east Bengalis forming the Mukti Bahini (freedom force). India’s support to the Mukti Bahini by training and the supply of arms, became imminent with millions seeking refuge in India.

Pakistan’s pre-emptive strike at India provided the Indian army the much-needed excuse to attack East Pakistan. By December 1971, Bangladesh emerged as an independent state.

Historical Relations with Bangladesh can be traced to the idea of India and Pakistan pre-dating 1947. The population of both the countries share close and multi-faceted socio-cultural, religious and linguistic ties. What is more, both countries have a distinct honour of having their national anthem written by the same poet ‘Rabindranath Tagore.’ The creation of Bangladesh with the support of India, is a significant milestone in the history of South Asia.

Establishment of a new state provided a chance for India to have a friendly neighbor. In January 1972, Mujibur Rahman assumed power as the Prime Minister of Bangladesh and his tenure happened to be one of the best times in India – Bangladesh Relations. His tenure also witnessed the signing of Indo-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty.

Of the various issues responsible for deteriorating Indo-Bangladesh relations, commissioning Farakka dam in West Bengal across Hooghly river, about 11 miles from Bangladesh’s border, has perhaps attracted the most International attention.

India maintains that it needs the barrage for the purpose of flushing the Hooghly River to make it free from silt and therefore keep the port of Calcutta operational and also to meet the demand from Kolkata for industrial and domestic use, and for irrigation purposes in other parts of West Bengal. Despite the negotiations since 1970’s at both regional and international levels, both the nations have still not been able to reconcile with a proper solution.

The Teesta River originates from Teesta Kangse glacier about 7,068 metres (23,189 ft.) height and flows southward to Sikkim, West Bengal and Bangladesh.

Teesta river merges with the Brahmaputra river when it enters Bangladesh and ends in the Bay of Bengal. Politically river Teesta water sharing continues to haunt both the countries.

The Teesta water dispute started when West Bengal government began constructing barrages on the river in 1979 mainly for irrigation purposes. The Bangladesh Government opposed it and argued that the major rice producing areas of Bangladesh, especially the ‘rice bowl’ Rangpur region lie in the Teesta and Brahmaputra river basin. In 1983, an ad-hoc agreement on water sharing was signed between both counties. Yet, being an upper riparian state, India has not been able to supply the promised amount of water.

New Moore Island is a small uninhabited offshore sandbar landform in the Bay of Bengal, off the coast of the Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta region. It emerged in the Bay of Bengal in the aftermath of the Bhola cyclone in 1970, and disappeared at some later point.

For nearly 30 years, India and Bangladesh have argued over control of a tiny rock island in the Bay of Bengal but later in 2010 the rising sea levels have resolved the dispute for them as the island was submerged. New Moore Island, in the Sunderbans, has been completely submerged, Its disappearance has been confirmed by satellite imagery and sea patrols. Scientists at the School of Oceanographic Studies have noted an alarming increase in the rate at which sea levels have risen over the past decade in the Bay of Bengal. Although the island was uninhabited and there were no permanent settlements or stations located on it, both India and Bangladesh claimed sovereignty over it because of speculation over the existence of oil and natural gas in the region.

In Permanent Court of Arbitration (PAC) the dispute was settled in July 2014 by a final verdict not open to appeal and in favour of Bangladesh. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) verdict awarded Bangladesh with 19,467 km2 out of 25,000 km2 disputed area with India in the Bay of Bengal. However New Moore Island has fallen in India’s part of the Bay of Bengal.

India and Bangladesh have a 2,979 km land border and 1,116 km of riverine boundary. They also share 54 common rivers, including the Brahmaputra. India’ s West Bengal, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Assam and Tripura share 4,096 km border with Bangladesh.

Tripura and other north-eastern states are surrounded by Bangladesh, Myanmar, Bhutan and China on three sides and the only land route access to these states from within India is through Assam and West Bengal by Siliguri or the Chicken’s Neck Corridor

The Chakmas and Hajongs living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts fled erstwhile East Pakistan in 1964-65, since they lost their land to the development of the Kaptai Dam on the Karnaphuli River. In addition, they also faced religious persecution as they were non-Muslims and did not speak Bengali.

The Chakmas and Hajongs eventually sought asylum in India. The Indian government set up relief camps in Arunachal Pradesh and a majority of them continue to live there even after five decades. According to the 2011 census, 47,471 Chakmas live in Arunachal Pradesh alone.

Bangladesh and India share a common border of 4096 km running through five states, namely, West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. There are 162 enclaves between Bangladesh and India. The border regions have emerged as a major transit point for smugglers of contraband goods, human traffickers and terrorist and insurgent groups living near the border. Hence, border management has become a major challenge for both countries.

Through negotiation between India and Bangladesh 50 enclaves were transferred to India and 111 transferred to Bangladesh. While the border issue is sorted to a great extent, through related issues like illegal arms smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking and cross border terrorism continue to haunt India and Bangladesh.

Trade has been growing steadily between the two countries (India and Bangladesh) at about 17% in the last 5 years. A bus service and a train service between Kolkata and Dhaka was also launched. Memorandam of Understanding (MoU) has been signed on the development of Ashuganj-Zakiganj stretch of Kushiyara river and Sirajganj-Daikhawa stretch of the Jamuna river to improve connectivity between the two countries and this will help reduce cost of cargo movement to northeast India and also reduce congestion through the Siliguri’s ‘Chicken’s Neck’ corridor.

Connectivity is an issue of mutual interest as these initiatives on passenger and goods trains will be of benefit to both Bangladesh and northeast India. Dhaka also has the central role in shaping the future of sub-regional cooperation with Bhutan, Burma, India and Nepal. It is also a land bridge to East Asia and the fulcrum of a future Bay of Bengal community. However, the most important issue in contemporary Asian geopolitics is transit and connectivity. In 2016 when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Bangladesh, it agreed to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China is already investing in a number of infrastructure projects in the country including the deep sea port at Chittagong. It is likely that these projects will now be subsumed under the BRI project which is the matter of concern for India.

Energy cooperation between the two sides has also shown a lot of positivity with Indian state Tripura supplying a total of 160 MW of power to Bangladesh in addition to the 500 MW the country is receiving from West Bengal since 2013. Bangladesh has sought extra 100 MW electricity from India to solve its power crisis, and will be likely on the negotiating table.

There are talks that a defence treaty is to be signed between India and Bangladesh, it will be a long-term defence deal that will allow for increased defence cooperation, information sharing, joint exercises, training and so on. However, India needs to figure out where it can meet Bangladesh’s security concerns, considering Bangladesh’s largest defence partner is China.

Expanding security cooperation with India could only enhance Dhaka’s global leverage. For India, a strong partnership with Bangladesh will help boost the prospects of peace and prosperity in the eastern subcontinent. Defence deal between the two nations on the basis of sovereign equality and geopolitical realities will take us a long way ahead. The India-Bangladesh relations can be summarised as hanging on three ‘T’s – 1. Tackling Terrorism, 2. Trade + Transit and 3. Teesta Treaty. we should hope to resolve the issues and take the relationship forward so that the growing mutual trust and political comfort between Delhi and Dhaka will have a long-term consequence. It is important for India’s North-East as well.

The Modern history of India-China relations starts after 1949, with China becoming a Communist country. India was one of the first country to recognise the People’s Republic of China. However, the initial relationship did not last long as India became suspicious of China’s intention when Tibet was occupied by the Chinese army in 1950.

The Hindi – Chini – Bhai Bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) enthusiasm in the 1950s did cast off some of India’s fears, but all these developments that happened in due course were lost with the India and China war of 1962.

India and China are civilizational powers with long and historical legacies. Buddhism went from India to China along with texts and culture. Fa Hien and Xuan Zhang are some of the travellers who came to ancient India to study. Add to the cultural relations, the ancient Silk Road allowed closer economic relations.

India and China share over 4056 km long border. It is divided into three sections; the border to the east of Bhutan, central border across [Utter Pradesh, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh (Subject to check)] and the border separating Jammu and Kashmir from Chinese territories of Sinkiang and Tibet.

India – China border is known as the McMahon Line, named after Arthur Henry McMahon who was the Secretary of State for India in the British Cabinet. This demarcation was determined in 1914 at the Conference of the representatives of British India, Tibet and China held at Shimla.

The boundary line (McMahon line) was drawn taking into consideration of the natural boundary as it passes through Tibetan Plateau in the north and Indian hills in the South. This boundary was accepted by all the representatives, although, China at a later date condemned it as an imperialist line. India continues to accept this line as the border with China.

In 1949, at the end of a protracted civil war, a communist regime was establised in China. China had always treated Tibet as its Province and used to collect tributes from her. The Communist regime also treated it as one of her autonomous Provinces. But, a theocratic Tibet could not reconcile with socialist China. The Tibetan issue, particularly granting asylum to Tibetan leader Dalai Lama and his people was a cause of rift between these two countries.

Ever since the occupation of Tibet, China started claiming many of Indian territory as theirs. Despite the talks both the countries had since the 1950s, there was hardly any progress in the clear demarcation of borders. Nonetheless, there was information about frequent cross border infiltrations. By 1961, India decided to firmly fix the borders and launched ‘forward policy’, establishing military posts in the disputed territories.

Forward policy move by India did not go well with China and it launched a massive attack on Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh on October 20, 1962. The war lasted only for 31 days, yet it made a long-lasting humiliating impact on India.

When China announced that it would be occupying Tibet, India sent a letter of protest proposing negotiations on the Tibet issue. China was even more active in deploying troops on the Aksai Chin border.

In 1954, China and India concluded the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, under which, India acknowledged Chinese rule in Tibet.

In July 1954, Nehru wrote a memo directing a revision in the maps of India to show definite boundaries on all frontiers; however, Chinese maps showed some 120,000 square kilometres of Indian territory as Chinese. On being questioned, Zhou Enlai, the first Premier of People’s Republic of China, responded that there were errors in the maps.

The People’s Republic of China’s leader, Mao Zedong felt humiliated by the reception Dalai Lama obtained in India when he fled there in March 1959. Tensions increased between the two nations when Mao stated that the Lhasa rebellion in Tibet was caused by Indians.

China’s perception of India as a threat to its rule of Tibet became one of the most prominent reasons for the Sino-Indian War. In October 1959, India realised that it was not ready for war after a clash between the two armies at Kongka Pass, in which nine Indian policemen were killed, the country assumed responsibility for the border and pulled back patrols from disputed areas. On October 20, 1962, China’s People’s Liberation Army invaded India in Ladakh, and crossed the McMahon Line in the then North-East Frontier Agency. Till the start of the war, the Indian side was confident that war would not be started and made little preparations. India had deployed only two divisions of troops in the region of the conflict, while the Chinese troops had three regiments positioned.

In 1962, the world’s two most populous countries went to war. The Sino-Indian War claimed about 2,000 lives and played out in the harsh terrain of the Karakoram Mountains, some 4,270 meters (14,000 feet) above sea level.

After hundreds of more deaths and an American threat to intervene on behalf of the Indians, the two sides declared a formal ceasefire on November 19, 1962. The Chinese announced that they would “withdraw from their present positions to the north of the McMahon Line.” Thus, the India-China War of 1962 ended and Colombo Conference was convened by Non-Aligned activist to resolve the dispute amicably.

Since the mid-1980s, India and China started having a closer bilateral economic relation. The process of dialogue initiated by the governments of the two countries helped in identifying the common trade interests. In 1984, India and China entered into a Trade Agreement, which provided them with the status of Most Favoured Nation (MFN). Since 1992, India and China have been involved in a full-fledged bilateral trade relation.

Even until this day, the 1962 Sino-Indian War is a widely debated topic. The end of the war threw a new boundary line between India and China known as Line of Actual Control (LAC). In 1993, an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the India-China border Areas was signed during Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to China. The LAC continues to be a matter of irritation between both countries

India was the 7th largest export destination for Chinese products and the 27th largest exporter to China. India’s top exports to China included diamonds, cotton yarn, iron ore, copper and organic chemicals.

China’s top exports to India include electrical machinery, equipment, fertilizers, Chinese antibiotics, Chinese organic chemicals. The cumulative Chinese investment in India till March 2017 stood at US$ 4.91 billion and the cumulative Indian investment in China till March 2017 reached US$ 705 million.

In the international arena, India and China are competitors for resources. Investments in many of the developing countries by both these emerging Asian giants are all to meet the increasing economic demands of India and China. Despite the widespread competition, India and China have also found some real convergence of interests. Both the countries support for multipolar world order and resist interventionist foreign policy doctrines emanating from the West, particularly the United States. In addition, China and India also share wide ranging concerns on climate change, trade negotiations, energy security, and global financial crisis. India and China also play a significant role in the WTO and global trade negotiations in the hope for getting better leverage for the developing world over developed states.

In addition to this significant role, China and India are also partners in major international organisations like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), EAS (East Asian Summit), SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), etc.

Since the Independence of India in 1947 and Sri Lanka in 1948, both India and Sri Lanka enjoyed closer relations with each other. Sri Lanka is an Island which is in Southern tip of Indian mainland.

Despite these closer relations, domestic developments in Sri Lanka has always had a negative impact on each other relations. The main reason for this negative impact is because of the ethnic crises between the Tamils and the Sinhalese and the Indian response towards this issue. Security interests and the shared ethnicity of Tamils living in southern India and in northern and eastern Sri Lanka are the two major factors in Indo – Sri Lankan relations

According to the 1921 Census, there were nearly 10 principal races, three pairs being subdivisions of larger groups, in Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon). Of these three were principal races namely, the Low Country and Kandyan Sinhalese, the Ceylon and Indian Tamils, and the Ceylon and Indian Moors. Four other specified races were the Burghers, Eurasians, Malays and Veddas.

The predominant community Sinhalese, which is about three-quarters of the population, are Buddhist and Speak Sinhalese. The Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka are also largely Hindus. The Muslims mainly of Tamil origin speak both Tamil and Sinhala.

One of the first issues between India and Sri Lankan began with the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948, where the Plantation Tamils or Malayaha Tamizhar were deprived of their citizenship.

Since the end of Eelam War IV, India – Sri Lanka relations have been more constructive. In the recent years the bilateral trade has increased manifold. Nevertheless there are few major concerns both countries need to work out. Return of Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees continues to be a matter of concern. Unless, there is favorable political situation in Sri Lanka, refugees will not return to their homeland. The attack on the Indian fishermen continues and has become a regular occurrence. There have been many suggestions to solve this crisis, including deep sea fishing, lease in perpetuity of Katchatheevu, alternate day fishing by Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen, etc., but sadly none of these suggestions have seen the light of the day.

Ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka has enormous impact on India- Sri Lanka relations due to large Tamil speaking population in southern India as well as the attempts by Sri Lanka to balance India’s influence with the Tamils in Sri Lanka by building geo-strategic pressure by engaging the West or the Chinese selectively. Sri Lanka is critical to India’s coastal security and its interests in the Indian Ocean Region. Any presence of external powers will hence have drastic impact on its defence and security.

In 1948, immediately after the country’s independence, a controversial law labelled the Ceylon Citizenship Act was passed in the Sri Lankan Parliament which deliberately discriminated against the Tamils of South Indian origin, whose ancestors had settled in the country in the 19th and 20th centuries. This Act made it virtually impossible for them to obtain citizenship and over 700,000 Tamils (consisting of up to 11% of the country’s total population) were made stateless.

In 1964, a pact was signed between Bandaranaike and the then Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to repatriate much of the population of the stateless Tamils. Over the next 30 years, successive Sri Lankan governments were actively engaged in deporting over 300,000 Tamils back to India. It wasn’t until 2003, after a state-sponsored programme against Tamils and a full-scale civil war, that Indian Tamils were granted citizenship but by this time, their population had dwindled to just 5% of the country’s population. Tamils repatriated to India were assimilated with location population after taking Indian citizenships.

Around 62,000 refugees, living in 107 camps across Tamil Nadu, have been receiving various relief measures of the Central and State governments. In addition, in recent years, the Tamil Nadu government has taken steps for scores of young boys and girls of the refugee community to join professional courses, particularly engineering. This has benefitted eligible candidates among 36,800 non-camp refugees in the State too.

At present, for both India and Sri Lanka, the repatriation of refugees must be a priority. Tamil Nadu hosts the largest number of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India. It would be in the interest of both the countries to find the permanent resolution for this problem. While for India a longstanding problem would be resolved, for Sri Lanka it would be a step towards ethnic reconciliation.

The two governments can come out with a comprehensive package on voluntary repatriation, after involving representatives of the refugee community, the Tamil Nadu government and Sri Lanka’s Northern Provincial Council. For refugees who want to stay back, India can consider providing them citizenship, as it did for refugees from Pakistan and Afghanistan. This can be acheived by filtering out any potential antisocial or anti-state elements, leading to the eventual closing down of refugee camps in Tamil Nadu. Such a process will bring an end to an episode that has lasted longer than the civil war of Sri Lanka.

Kachatheevu originally belonged to kings of Ramanathapuram. No maps of Sri Lanka showed it as its territory. However, seeing its strategic location, Sri Lanka started claiming it. The issue was discussed some times during the meeting between Indian and Sri Lankan leaders.

In 1974 Indira Gandhi signed an agreement whereby Kachatheevu was given to Sri Lanka. Katchatheevu has a Catholic shrine and has been declared as a sacred area by the government of Sri Lanka.

Katchatheevu is an uninhabited 285-acre island situated in between India and Sri Lanka in the Gulf of Mannar. It has a Catholic shrine and has been declared as a sacred area by the government of Sri Lanka. The shrine attracts devotees from both the countries. This 1974 agreement had secured the rights of Indian fishermen only to dry their nets and use the Church for religious observance.

In 1976, delimitation of International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) was agreed upon as required by the UNCLOS. With this, Indian fishermen do not have any right to even engage in drying of nets and use of Church because 1976 agreement superseded 1974 agreement. Since then our fishermen are facing innumerable problems.

The Nehru-Kotelawala Pact was an agreement that was signed between Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, and John Kotelawala, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, on 18 January 1954. It was an agreement regarding to the status and future of people of Indian origin in Ceylon. They were brought by British from Madras Presidency in British India to work in tea, coffee and coconut plantations of British Ceylon.

In the pact, India accepted in principle the repatriation of Indian population in Ceylon. But Jawaharlal Nehru only supported voluntary repatriation of those who accepted Indian citizenship. India disagreed on Sri Lankan position that suggested granting Indian citizenship to people, who failed to qualify for Sri Lankan citizenship.

Mrs Srimavo Bandaranaike visited India in 1964. After prolonged negotiations, an agreement was signed between Bandaranaike and Shastri.

™ It sought to solve the problem of 9 lakh 75 Thousand stateless persons in Sir Lanka using the following formula:

™ 3 lakh people will get Sir Lankan citizenship.

™ 5 lakh 25 thousand will get Indian citizenship. They were to move to India in a period spanning over 15 years.

™ Remaining 1.50 lakh stateless persons fate was to be decided later

Diplomatic agreement between PM Rajiv Gandhi and Srilanka President JR Jayawardane to solve the ethnic problem.

The construction of 43,000 houses for resettlement and rehabilitation of IDPs in Northern and Eastern Provinces is part of the overall commitment to build 50,000 houses announced by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during the State visit of the President of Sri Lanka Mahinda Rajapaksa to India, in June 2010, 47,000 have been completed until 2018. USD 350 million grant to build the houses was one of the largest grants by India in any country.

Indian PM flagged off a train service at the north-western Sri Lankan town of Talaimannar – the closest point to India – restored after decades of civil war, completing the reconstruction of the entire Northern Province Railway Line. Accompanied by Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena, Modi also unveiled a plaque inaugurating Talaimannar 1650 Pier Railway station. The newly-constructed 63-km railway track is the last segment of the 265-km long, prestigious Northern Railway Line Reconstruction Project which is being executed by IRCON International Ltd., a Government of India owned company.

During the period of Lal Bahadur Sastri’s premiership an agreement was reached between the two nations in resolving the issues of Indian origin Tamils. India agreed to provide citizenship to two thirds of the people of Indian origin; But the ethnic conflict between native Tamils (Eelam Tamils) and the Singhalese erupted into a protracted civil war, revolting a massive influx of Tamil refugees into India.

™ India can try to get back the island of Kachchatheevu at-least on “lease in perpetuity” or by negotiations.

™ Permit licensed Indian fishermen to fish within a designated area of Sri Lankan waters and vice versa.

™ There is a glaring need for institutionalisation of fishing in Indian waters by the Government of India so that alternative means of livelihood are provided.

™ Government will have to mark up a comprehensive plan to reduce the dependence of Indian fishermen on catch from Palk Bay. If these social issues can be sorted out. India and Sri Lankan can become prime movers in the regional polity.

India and Nepal are geographically close to each other. Nepal’s lowland areas are a part of the Gangetic plain and it occupies the central part of the Himalayan foothills and mountains that extends between China and South Asia. Nepal had been earlier the only Hindu Kingdom in the world. However, one –eighth of its population are Buddhists and there is a small population of Muslims and Christians living in the country.

Nepal and India share a border of over 1850 kms in the East, South and West with five states, Sikkim, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand sharing their borders. While Nehru always regarded Nepal as a sovereign state, at the same time it was considered as an integral part of India’s security system.

Occupation of Tibet by China in 1951 affirmed Nepal’s importance in India’s security umbrella. It was never a “threat from Nepal” but “threat to Nepal”, that India could not afford. An important step towards establishing such an order was the signing of Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal on July 31, 1950. India’s overtures to Nepal went beyond the security interest. On the same day of signing Peace and Friendship Treaty, both the countries also signed Treaty of Trade and Commerce. This agreement became a hallmark of close economic relations between both the countries.

India’s relations with Nepal in the immediate aftermath of independence of both the countries revolved around the political struggle between the King and the Rana’s, (Prime Ministerial clan of Nepal). While negotiating the 1950 Treaty India was also persuading Nepal’s Rana rulers to liberalize their political system to become more democratic and accommodate a section of the population that was fighting to get political rights and freedom. However, India’s advice did not seem to be making much impact on the Ranas, which forced New Delhi to adapt proactive stance and intervene directly in the Nepali situation.

India’s approach to Nepal remained consistent ever after the death of Nehru. The subsequent Prime Ministers Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, VP Singh and Chandrashekar followed the same policies for Nepal. There were numerous bilateral visits taken by Prime Ministers of both countries to improve ties.

Nepal, the only South Asian country to have never been formally colonized, is situated between India and China, two massive competing economies, each with a unique historical relationship with the Himalayan region. Post 1990’s India has been following a twin pillar policy since restoration of the multi-party system. The pillars include constitutional monarch and multi-party democracy sustaining together. But this policy started experiencing strains with the beginning of new millennium due to two reasons, namely, the changing character of monarchy and the growing intensity of the Maoist insurgency.

Nepal and China finalized the protocol of their Transit and Transport deal. Nepal declined to attend BIMSTEC military exercise (MILEX 2018) hosted by India.

India and Nepal share a very special relationship with each other. They share a common culture and terrain south of the Himalaya. Bound by languages and religions, marriage and mythology, the links of their civilizational contacts run through both the countries.  At the people to people level, relations between India and Nepal are closer and more multifaceted than between India and any other country.  Republic of India and Nepal began their formal relationship with the 1950 Indo- Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship. This treaty is the cornerstone of our current relation with Nepal.

Prime Minister Modi gave a new “5T” (Tradition, Trade, Tourism, Technology and transport) formula for India-Nepal relation during his visit in May, 2018. Nepal’s geographical location is unique such that it is a natural buffer between India and China. Since Nepal is a landlocked country it greatly depends on India for its interaction with the outside world.

India and Nepal share a common culture and have a long history of people to people relationship. Nepali and Indian people visit each other’s country for religious pilgrimage. Pashupati and Janakpur are traditional centres in Nepal whereas Varanasi and the four Dhaams are important pilgrimage destination in India. It is said that India and Nepal have ‘Roti Beti ka Rishta’ (ties of food and family).

The Buddhist network is interlinked — Lumbini is in Nepal, while Kushinagar, Gaya and Sarnath are located in India.

The 1950 India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship is a bilateral pact between the Government of Nepal and Government of India aimed at establishing a close strategic relationship between the two South Asian neighbours. The treaty was inked at Kathmandu on July 31, 1950 by then Prime Minister of Nepal Mohan Shamsher Jang Bahadur Rana and the then Indian ambassador to Nepal, Chadreshwar Narayan Singh. The treaty permits free movement of people and goods between the two countries and a close relationship and collaboration on matters of defence and foreign affairs.

India is Nepal’s largest trade partner and the largest source of foreign investments, besides providing transit for almost the entire trade which Nepal has with other countries.

Water Resources and energy cooperation of India and Nepal:

™ A three–tier mechanism established in 2008, to discuss all bilateral issues relating to cooperation in water resources and hydropower.

™ Nepal has many fast-flowing rivers and its terrain makes it ideal for hydroelectric power generation. Nepal’s installed capacity is less than 700 MW while it has a potential to generate over 80,000 MW.

™ A 900 megawatts hydropower project Arun III has been launched recently.

™ An Agreement on “Electric Power Trade, Cross-border Transmission Interconnection and Grid Connectivity” was signed between India and Nepal in 2014.

™ A Joint Technical Team (JTT) has been formed for preparation of long-term integrated transmission plan covering projects up to 2035

Bilateral defence cooperation includes assistance to Nepal Army in its modernization through provision of equipment and training. About 250 training slots are provided every year for training of Nepal Army personnel in various Indian Army Training institutions.

The Gorkha Regiments of the Indian Army are raised partly by recruitment from hill districts of Nepal. Since 1950, India and Nepal have been awarding Army Chiefs of each other with the honorary rank of General.

India and Nepal conducted a joint military exercise, Surya Kiran XIII from May 30 to June 12 in Uttarakhand in 2018.

Recently a MoU was signed between India and Nepal on Raxaul- Kathmandu railway line. A postal highway project is also being undertaken. Both the countries are also focused on inland waterways connectivity.

The Governments of India and Nepal have signed three sister-city agreements for twinning of Kathmandu-Varanasi, Lumbini-Bodhgaya and Janakpur- Ayodhya.

Nepal and India share Hindu and Buddhist heritage. Lumbini, the birth place of Lord Buddha is in Nepal while Bodh Gaya where he attained enlightenment is in India. Similarly, the Hindu pilgrimage places are also spread in both countries.

Between India and Nepal direct bus service between Janakpur and Ayodhya under Ramayan Circuit under Swadesh Darshan Scheme was launched.

The two major areas of dispute at Susta and Kalapani (India-China-Nepal tri-junction). Countries agreed to start talks at the foreign secretary-level in order to resolve the problem, however, only a single round of talk has taken place in 2015.

There is an open border between India and Nepal which leads to illegal migration and human trafficking. Indo-Nepal border is used as launch pad by maoist, terrorist and drug traffickers.

The India-Nepal Treaty of 1950 has been criticized by the Nepali political elite as an unequal one. Treaty obliged Nepal to inform India and seek its consent for the purchases of military hardware from third countries. Nepal wants to change this provision. The Nepal-India Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) is revisiting all bilateral agreements to submit a comprehensive report to both governments on how to reset bilateral relations.

According to the Transit and Transport Agreement between Nepal and China. Nepalese traders can use rail or road to access seaports. China to give permit to trucks and containers ferrying Nepal bound cargo to and from Xigatse in Tibet. Nepal to access Chinese territory from six check points. Distance an issue as nearest Chinese port is more than 2.000km away from Nepal. Traders say lack of proper roads and customs infrastructure on the Nepalese side is a challenge.

Nepal and China finalized the Protocol of Transit and Transport deal. As per the agreement Nepal can access four ports and three dry ports paving way for the use of Chinese ports for trade. This will reduce Nepal’s dependency on India for its trade. These and other road and railway projects between China and Nepal will allow China to potentially project power against India on a different section of the Sino-Indian boundary.

India has an advantage of geography on its side. Chinese rail and port connectivity projects are not very feasible owing to the difficult terrain. The nearest Chinese ports will be close to 3000 km away while Kolkata and Visakhapatnam ports, which Nepal currently uses are much more- closer.

India shares a special relation with Bhutan. Being a land locked country, Bhutan is depended on India for most of its products and financial support and India on its part has been providing all possible support. This makes both the countries ideal example for good neighbourly relations.

Treaty of Punaksha (1910): Bhutan become protectorate state of British India. It means Bhutan to have internal autonomy and not external autonomy.

The Indo-Bhutan Treaty is dubbed as the corner stone of Bhutan’s foreign policy. Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1949) is termed as the continuation of the Anglo-Bhutanese Treaty of 1910. It treats the Himalayas as the sentinel of India’s security.

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in 1949. India and Bhutan signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship on August 8, 1949, in Darjeeling.

Diplomatic relations between India and Bhutan was established in 1968 with the appointment of a resident representative of India in Thimpu. Before this India’s relations with Bhutan were looked after by the Political Officer in Sikkim.

On India’s initiative, Bhutan has become a member of the Colombo Plan in 1965, joined Universal Postal Service in 1969 and finally India sponsored Bhutan’s membership in 1971. Bhutan’s relations with the NAM (Non- Aligned Movement) countries are yet another initiative of India.

Revised treaty (2007)

™ On request of Bhutan, India revised treaty of friendship and cooperation

™ It has been suggested that the revised one modifies India’s role from guiding partner to a close friend and equal partner.

™ Under the revised norms Bhutan no longer require India’s approval over importing arms.

™ There are no limitations for Bhutan with respect to other countries, but it cannot use its territory for activities against India’s security threat.

Treaty of Cooperation in Hydropower and Protocol (2006): Under this, India has agreed to assist Royal government of Bhutan in developing a minimum of 10,000 MW of hydropower and import the surplus electricity from this to India by the year 2020.

India-Bhutan Trade and Transit Agreement (1972): It provides for duty-free transit of Bhutanese exports to third countries.

™ India has constructed three hydroelectric projects (HEPs) in Bhutan totaling 1416 MW.

™ Hydropower exports provide more than 40% of Bhutan’s domestic revenues and constitute 25% of its GDP.

™ Presently, there are three Inter-Government (IG) model is under construction

Both the countries India and Bhutan have conducted joint military operation against insurgents. The most notable was in 2004 when the Royal Bhutanese army conducted operations against ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam)

Regular visits between highest level Government functionaries of both the countries have become a tradition. For example, in 2014, our Prime Minister chose Bhutan as his first country to visit after getting elected. India sends foreign service officers to Bhutan to maintain good diplomatic relations.

Bhutan is a founding member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). It is also a member of BIMSTEC, World Bank, the IMF, Group of 77 and others.

Bhutanese currency is Ngultrum (Nu.) and is officially pegged to the Indian Rupee (Rs.). India remains the single largest trading partner of Bhutan. In 2016 a new trade agreement was signed. This agreement aims at cutting down the documentation related to trade and establishing additional trading points in Bhutan. India also offers duty free transit to Bhutan for trade with third countries.

The fourth King of Bhutan King Jigme Singye Wangchuck coined the phrase “Gross Nations Happiness” in 1972 and declared that is more important than GDP.

Many Bhutanese students pursue undergraduate courses in Indian universities on self-financing basis. India-Bhutan foundation was established in 2003 for improving people to people cooperation in the areas of culture, education and environment protection.

Bhutan has been taken as safe haven by insurgent elements like National Democratic Front for Bodoland (NDFB), United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) militants and Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO) that often pose threat to internal peace and security in the northeast region of India.

Doklam, or Donglang in China, is an area spread over less than a 100 sq km comprising a plateau and a valley at the trijunction between India, Bhutan and China. It is surrounded by the Chumbi Valley of Tibet, Bhutan’s Ha Valley and Sikkim.

Doklam is strategically located close to the Siliguri corridor, which connects mainland India with its north-eastern region. The corridor, also called Chicken’s Neck, is a vulnerable point for India. In recent years however, China has been beefing up its military presence in the Chumbi Valley, where the Chinese are at a great disadvantage militarily. Both Indian and Bhutanese troops are on a higher ground around the Valley.

Despite several rounds of engagement between China and Bhutan, the dispute between the two over Doklam has not been resolved. It flared up in 2017 when the Chinese were trying to construct a road in the area, and Indian troops, in aid of their Bhutanese counterparts, objected to it resulting in the stand-off.

Explanation

Issue with Hydropower projects

™ Bhutan supplies power to India at very cheap rate.

™ Bhutan alleged that India wanted greater role in management on joint venture Hydro projects in Bhutan.

™ Cross Border Trade of Electricity (CBTE) issued by power ministry will establish the monopoly of India being Bhutan’s sole power market. It restricts the type of hydro power investments that could be made in Bhutan.

™ Hydro power plants are also attached with certain environmental concerns.

™ There is a frequent visit of state heads to boost the bilateral relations. ™ India announced assistance for establishment of an E-Project covering all the 20 districts of Bhutan. ™ The Prime Minister coined the idea of B2B as ‘Bharat to Bhutan’ for building effective and renewed bilateral relationship. ™ Bhutan recently become the largest beneficiary of India’s foreign aid. ™ A 1,000 strong Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) is permanently based in western Bhutan to train the Royal Bhutan Army, while other units regularly cooperate with the Royal Bhutan Army.

1. India-Bhutan relationship is like ‘milk and water’. They cannot be separated. Therefore India should leave no stone unturned to maintain good relations with Bhutan. 2. India needs to complete some of the hydropower projects that were delayed due to lack of funds. 3. India has a very good relationship with Bhutan whereas China has many border disputes with Bhutan. This relationship and goodwill must be maintained to counter China’s strategic calculations in Bhutan and the region. 4. India needs to augment the connectivity of Bhutan and its North Eastern states for the region’s economic development. 5. India needs to combine the Gross National Happiness of Bhutan with its own economic development to maintain a shared prosperity and relationship between the two countries.

India – Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) relations goes back to 2500 years. For the Burmese, Buddhist connections binds both India and Burma together. According to the legend of Shwedagon Pagoda – the heart of the temple is on the buried strands of Lord Buddha’s hair gifted by him to two Burmese merchants. It’s this belief that made King Ashoka to build pagodas in Burma and also for the spread of Buddhism.

The defence of Burma is in fact the defence of India and it is India’s primary concern no less than Burma’s to see that its frontiers remain inviolate. In fact, no responsibility can be considered too heavy for India when it comes to the question of defending Myanmar. – K. M Panikkar

India shares a long land border of over 1600 Km with Myanmar as well as a maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal. Four north-eastern states viz. Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram share boundary with Myanmar. These geo-strategic realities encompass our broader interests in the Indian Ocean region. Both countries share a heritage of religious, linguistic and ethnic ties.

Myanmar is the only ASEAN country adjoining India and, therefore, our gateway to South East Asia with which we are seeking greater economic integration through India’s ‘Look East’ and now ‘Act East’ policy. Business opportunities that emerge from a surging economy in Myanmar also provide new vistas for engagement.

India’s Look East policy represents its efforts to cultivate extensive economic and strategic relations with the nations of Southeast Asia in order to bolster its standing as a regional power and a counterweight to the strategic influence of the People’s Republic of China. Two highways involving Myanmar play a vital role in improving connectivity in the South East Asian region.